Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Legal Issues Involving Children by Shepherd, Robert E., Jr.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 33 | Issue 3 Article 12
1999
Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Legal Issues
Involving Children
Robert E. Shepherd Jr.
University of Richmond
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Juvenile Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert E. Shepherd Jr., Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Legal Issues Involving Children, 33 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1001 (1999).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/12
LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING CHILDREN
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. "
I. INTRODUCTION
The Virginia General Assembly once again acted in a very
restrained fashion in addressing juvenile justice issues in the
lengthening wake after the extensive statutory changes in 1994 and
1996. The newly enacted juvenile competency statute is an
important innovation contained in the new article 18 of title 16.1 of
the Virginia Code,1 and a study by the Virginia Bar Association on
the applicability of the insanity defense in juvenile delinquency
proceedings will further address the implications of mental health
problems for children in trouble.2 One major issue in the
delinquency area that arose during the past year involved the
necessity ofnotifyingboth parents, if their identities or whereabouts
are known, that their child is before the juvenile court, especially
where the petition involves delinquency or transfer to the criminal
court.3 The Virginia Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of Virginia
concluded that notice to both parents was a necessary prerequisite
for the jurisdiction of the court in transfer and certification matters,
and presumably in other proceedings as well.4 The General
Assembly limited the long term effects of these decisions by
amending the Virginia Code to require only notice to "at least one
parent" as of July 1, 1999.'
The General Assembly acted to ameliorate slightly the harshness
of requiring the automatic expulsion of students from public schools
pursuant to the "zero tolerance" laws for the possession of weapons
or drugs.6 This was accomplished by authorizing local School Boards
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. B.A., 1959, LL.B., 1961,
Washington and Lee University.
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-356 to -361 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
2. See H.J. Res. 680, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999).
3. See Baker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 1, 516 S.E.2d 219 (1999) (per curiam).
4. See id., affg 28 Va. App. 306, 504 S.E.2d 394 (Ct. App. 1998).
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-263 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
6. See id. §§ 22.1-277.01 to -277.01:1 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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to allow the division superintendent or a designee to conduct a
preliminary review of an individual case to determine if such an
extreme sanction is appropriate.7 Recent cases also addressed the
scope of searches in school settings,' and the General Assembly
directed the Virginia Board of Education to develop guidelines for
conducting strip searches in the schools?9 The United States
Supreme Court clarified when a school division might be liable for
money damages pursuant to Title IX'0 for student-on-student sexual
harassment."
II. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR
The Commission on Youth's study of truancy and runaway
behavior by juveniles led to several amendments to the law by the
1999 General Assembly. 2 Section 16.1-228, the definitions section
of the juvenile code, was amended to include a new definition of a
"child in need of supervision." 3 This provision now provides that a
child who deserts or runs away on more than one occasion may be
found to be such a child, rather than conditioning the finding on a
conclusion that the juvenile acted "habitually."'4 Another statutory
change produced by the Commission on Youth study amends the
intake section of the juvenile code to allow intake officers to proceed
informally in cases involving children in need of supervision
("CHINSup") if there has not been a prior adjudication or informal
adjustment, or if the juvenile is not the subject of a complaint filed
by a school division pursuant to section 22.1-258 of the Virginia
Code.' 5
The intake section of the juvenile code was also amended in 1999
to expand the offenses for which an intake officer, upon the filing of
a petition, and the clerk of the court, upon adjudication of delin-
7. See id. §§ 22.1-277.01(A), -277.01:1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
8. See DeRoches v. Caprio, 156 F.3d 571 (4th Cir. 1998); Smith v. School Bd., 46 Va. Cir.
238 (Norfolk City 1998).
9. See VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-277.01:2 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
10. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
11. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
12. See REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA COMMISSION ON YOUTH STUDY OF TRUANTS AND
RUNAWAYS, H. Doc. No. 57 (1999).
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
14. See id.
15. See id. §§ 16.1-260 (Repl. Vol. 1999), 22.1-258 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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quency or a conviction, must notify the superintendent of the school
division in which the child is enrolled or was enrolled at the time of
the offense.16 The offenses added are robbery and violations dealing
with illegal weapons, including machine guns, sawed-off shotguns
and rifles.'7 The same bill was amended, at the request of the
Governor, during the "Veto Session" to include a provision requiring
that only one parent be notified when a civil or criminal petition is
filed concerning a juvenile. 8 A bill to the same effect introduced
during the regular session was killed in the Senate Courts of Justice
Committee. 9 Although the amendment was intended to address
problems of notice in delinquency or transfer and certification cases,
the section in question applies to notice in all cases arising in
juvenile court and may well be unconstitutional if it is applied to
child custody, abuse or neglect, termination of parental rights, or
similar cases where due process requires notice to parents in
matters where family autonomy issues exist.
2°
A 1999 enactment requires the Virginia Board of Education to
develop, in consultation with the Office of the Attorney General,
guidelines for the conduct of strip searches in public schools and
mandates that a report on the development of the guidelines be
made to the General Assembly.
2
'
Legislation enacted in 1998, effective July 1, 1999, requires drug
screening and assessments as a part of social history investigations
of certain offenders.22 The legislation was controversial because of
the fiscal and work impact it would have on juvenile court service
units. A 1999 amendment makes such an assessment contingent on
whether the screening identifies the juvenile offender as having a
substance abuse problem. It further provides that screenings and
16. See id. § 16.1-260(G) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
17. See id. § 16.1-260(G)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
18. See id. § 16.1-263(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999). This will change the result in Baker v.
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 1, 516 S.E.2d 219 (1999) (per curiam) for cases arising on or after
July 1, 1999.
19. See H.B. 1931, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999).
20. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545
(1965).
21. See VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-277.01:2 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
22. See id. § 16.1-273 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
23. See id. § 16.1-273(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
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assessments may be performed by a person working under the
direction of a certified substance abuse counselor rather than by the
counselor.' The Secretary of Public Safety is responsible for
convening an Interagency Offender Drug Assessment and Screening
Committee to oversee the implementation of the legislation and the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia may select pilot sites
for the implementation of its provisionsY An amendment to section
16.1-277.1 tolls the time limitations provided for certain hearings
involving a juvenile during "any period in which (i) the whereabouts
of the child are unknown, (ii) the child has escaped from custody, or
(iii) the child has failed to appear pursuant to a court order.2 6
Another 1999 amendment allows the juvenile court to require a
juvenile found delinquent based on certain crimes to participate in
a gang-activity prevention program, funded under the Virginia
Juvenile Community Crime Control Act. 7 The amendment requires
that transfer reports and social history reports include an assess-
ment of affiliation with a youth gang.2" Similar legislation requires
the court to have a juvenile found delinquent based on certain
crimes make at least partial restitution or reparation for any
property damage or loss caused by the offense or for actual medical
expenses incurred by the victim as a result of the offense for which
the juvenile was found to be delinquent.29 It also requires the
juvenile to participate in a public service project under such
conditions as the court prescribes.30 The crimes covered are
shooting, stabbing, and the like, with intent to maim or kill;
malicious bodily injury to law enforcement officers; malicious bodily
injury by means of a caustic substance; shooting while committing
or attempting to commit a felony; bodily injuries caused by prison-
ers, probationers, or parolees; unlawful hazing; assault and battery;
assault and battery against law enforcement officers; assault and
battery against household members; entering property of another
for the purpose of damaging it; injuries to churches or cemeteries;
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. Id. § 16.1-277.1(D) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
27. See id. §§ 16.1-309.2 to -309.10 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
28. See id. §§ 16.1-269.2, -273, -278.8 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
29. See id. § 16.1-278(A), (B) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
30. See id.
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trespass on church or school property; injuring any property or
monument; damaging public buildings; breaking into any part of
any vehicle, aircraft, or boat; and entering or setting in motion any
vehicle, aircraft or boat.3"
The legislature continues to widen the breach in the traditional
wall of confidentiality surrounding proceedings in juvenile court or
protecting the records of the court. Legislation adopted in 1999
provides that whenever a juvenile fourteen years of age or older is
charged with a delinquent act that, if committed by an adult, would
be a felony involving a weapon, a violation of "mob offenses"32 or of
"drug offenses,"" the judge may, where the public interest requires,
make the juvenile's name and address available to the public.34 Prior
law covered, in such circumstances, only an "act of violence" as
defined in Virginia Code section 19.2-297.1(A). 35
An amendment to section 16.1-330.1 allows juveniles who are
being supervised by the Serious or Habitual Offender Comprehen-
sive Action Program ("SHOCAP") as of their eighteenth birthday to
continue to be supervised until age twenty-one.36
An amendment to the Virginia Code makes it a Class 5 felony for
a probationer or parolee to inflict bodily injury on a juvenile
probation or parole officer, as well as on an adult officer. 7 Another
amendment provides for a mandatory period of incarceration of two
days when the object of a battery is a teacher, principal, or guidance
counselor and six months of mandatory incarceration if a gun or
other weapon prohibited on school property is used. 8 An additional
enactment provides that all of the offenses in subdivisions 1 through
9 of Virginia Code section 53.1-203 apply to secure juvenile correc-
31. See id.
32. See id. §§ 18.2-38 to -46 (RepI. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
33. See id. 99 18.2-247 to -265 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
34. See id. § 16.1-309.1 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
35. See id. (Cum. Supp. 1998).
36. See id § 16.1-330.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
37. See id. § 18.2-55(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
38. See id. § 18.2-57(D) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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tional institutions or detention homes, as well as adult facilities,
and are punishable as Class 1 misdemeanors.39
A 1999 amendment provides that a court shall suspend all or any
portion of the prescribed civil penalty where it finds that a defen-
dant retail establishment has trained its employees concerning the
law on the prohibited purchase or possession of tobacco products by
minors or sale of tobacco products to minors.4 ° The bill also autho-
rizes the court to impose a civil penalty up to a maximum of $1,000,
in lieu of the lesser civil penalties, for aviolation where it finds that
a defendant retail establishment has failed to train its employees.4
The bill also authorizes the court to prescribe community service
instead of imposing the civil penalty against a minor.4 2
The most significant legislative action in the area of juvenile
delinquency established new juvenile court procedures for determin-
ing whether a juvenile is competent to stand trial, for the restora-
tion of competency, and for dispositions for unrestorably incompe-
tent juveniles.43 A juvenile's competency is presumed in every
proceeding, although the Commonwealth's Attorney, defense
counsel, or judge can raise the issue of competency.' The Commis-
sioner of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse
Services is to approve the training for and determine the qualifica-
tions of professionals who will perform the evaluations and provide
restoration services.45 Evaluations are to be performed on an
outpatient basis whenever possible.4" If the juvenile is otherwise
able to understand the charges against him and assist in his
defense, a finding of incompetency cannot be made based solely on
"(i) the juvenile's age or developmental factors, (ii) the juvenile's
39. See id. § 18.2-477.2 (Cum. Supp. 1999) (including the following offenses: escape;
damaging property to escape; possession of knife, chemical compound, drugs or firearms; and
burning property).
40. See id. § 18.2-371.2(D) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. §§ 16.1-356 to -361 (Repl. Vol. 1999). This legislation came out ofa Commission
on Youth Task Force report. See REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA COMMISSION ON YOUTH STUDY OF
JUVENILE COMPETENCY ISSUES N LEGAL PROCEEDINGS, H. Doc. No. 42 (1999).
44. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-356(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
45. See id.
46. See id. § 16.1-356(C) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
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claim to be unable to remember the time period surrounding the
alleged offense, or (iii) the fact that the juvenile is under the
influence of medication."47 Incompetent juveniles must receive
restoration services.' If the juvenile is likely to remain incompetent
for the foreseeable future, the court shall order that the juvenile be
committed, be certified, become the subject of a child in need of
services petition, or be released.4 9
The most highly publicized and controversial court decision of the
past year in the delinquency area was Baker v. Commonwealth,0
wherein the Virginia Court of Appeals concluded that the failure of
the juvenile court to serve notice on the juvenile defendant's
biological father prior to a transfer hearing deprived the circuit
court of jurisdiction to try Baker as an adult." The Supreme Court
of Virginia affirmed the decision in a per curiam opinion and refused
to grant the Attorney General's request that the ruling be given only
prospective effect.5" The court of appeals noted that section 16.1-263
of the Virginia Code required service on the "parents," and the
absence of service, or even an attempt of service, on the biological
father deprived the juvenile court and, ultimately, the circuit court
ofjurisdiction over Baker.53 There was not even a certification that
the identity of the father or his whereabouts were unknown."' The
impact of the decision on other convictions is open to speculation,
but, in two cases involving juveniles on death row for capital murder
convictions and death sentences, the executions were stayed because
of questions relating to notice to parents.55 In Weese v. Common-
wealth,56 the court of appeals ruled that where the juvenile's parents
47. Id. § 16.1-356(F) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
48. See id. § 16.1-357(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
49. See id. § 16.1-358 (Repl. Vol. 1999). The legislation is modeled after the adult
competency provisions found in title 19.2 of the Virginia Code.
50. 28Va. App. 306,504 S.E.2d 394 (Ct. App. 1998), affd 258 Va. 1,516 S.E.2d 219(1999).
51. See 28 Va. App. at 313, 504 S.E.2d at 398.
52. See Baker, 258 Va. at 1, 516 S.E.2d at 219 The supreme court denied a rehearing to
the Commonwealth by an order on July 30, 1999.
53. See 28 Va. App. at 313,504 S.E.2d at 398; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-263 (Cum.
Supp. 1998).
54. See 28 Va. App. at 313, 504 S.E.2d at 398.
55. See Thomas v. Commonwealth, Nos. 991284, 991291 (Va. June 16-17, 1999)
(executions stayedjust hours before the scheduled execution); Roaeh v. Commonwealth, Nos.
991816, 991817 (Va. Aug. 6, 1999) (execution stayed that was scheduled for Aug. 25, 1999).
56. 30 Va. App. 484, 517 S.E.2d 740 (Ct. App. 1999).
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had notice of the juvenile court proceedings, there was no need to
give new notices of the de novo hearing on appeal in the circuit
court.
5 7
The court of appeals affirmed a trial court's suppression of a
youth's confession in Commonwealth v. Benjamin,58 where the
videotape of the detective reading the juvenile defendant his
Miranda rights demonstrated that the advice was "so jumbled and
unintelligible" that the judge inquired whether the officer was
"speaking in tongues.""s The evidence supported the judge's
suppression of the ensuing confession on the ground that it was not
voluntary because the challenged reading was the functional
equivalent of a total failure to read the defendant his Miranda
rights. 6
0
Three other confession cases arose out of the City of Norfolk. In
Commonwealth v. Williams,"' the trial judge suppressed a confes-
sion because the juvenile had diminished capabilities, was inexperi-
enced with the criminal justice system, and was interrogated after
his preliminary hearing at his own request but in the absence of his
lawyer who had specifically requested that his client not be
questioned unless he was present. 2 The appellate court reversed
this decision, concluding that, in light of the totality of the circum-
stances, there was no deprivation of the youth's Fifth Amendment
rights.63 In Commonwealth v. Ruffin,64 the circuit court judge ruled
that a fourteen-year-old's confession was admissible where he was
advised of his rights and waived them in his mother's presence and
the totality of the circumstances showed that his statement was
voluntary. 5 Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Bazemore,66 the circuit
court admitted a confession obtained after a juvenile suspect was
57. See id. at 491, 517 S.E.2d at 744.
58. 28 Va. App. 548, 507 S.E.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1998).
59. Id. at 553, 507 S.E.2d at 19.
60. See id.
61. No. 2204-98-1, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 215, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1999)
(unreported decision).
62. See id. at *21.
63. See id. at *21-22.
64. 45 Va. Cir. 1 (Norfolk City 1997).
65. See id. at 7.
66. 46 Va. Cir. 178 (Norfolk City 1998).
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advised of his rights in the presence of his parents, although they
left the interrogation room before the questioning began.67 The
discussion of the youth's learning disability as a factor in the
intelligence of the waiver of rights and in the voluntariness of the
confession is notably superficial and troubling, as it conveys the
impression that such a disability would only have an impact on
reading comprehension."
The only search and seizure cases this past year involved searches
in school settings. In DesRoches v. Caprio,69 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision granting
injunctive relief against the Norfolk city schools7 and ruled that
school officials did not act unreasonably in repeatedly requesting to
search the backpack of a high school student for a set of missing
tennis shoes after the other eighteen class members had submitted
to the search. 7' The appellate court found the student's continued
refusal to consent to the search after all the other students had
acquiesced provided the individualized suspicion justifying the
search.72 The case is unusual in that the item searched for was an
article of clothing and not weapons or drugs.7" The other search case
also arose in Norfolk and involved a general challenge to the school
search practices in that city's schools. In Smith v. Norfolk City
School Board,4 the court upheld the random search policy and
procedures utilized in the school system in light of the methods used
for the searches and the "compelling governmental interest"
involved.75
67. See id. at 188.
68. See id. at 186. The opinion notes that the almost eighteen-year-old youth had
completed the ninth grade, but was several grades behind in school. See id. See generally
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. & Barbara A. Zaremba, Juvenile Justice: When a Disabled Juvenile
Confesses to a Crime: Should It Be Admissible?, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1995, at 31.
69. 156 F.3d 571 (4th Cir. 1998).
70. See Desoches v. Caprio, 974 F. Supp. 542, 551 (E.D. Va. 1997), rev'd 156 F.3d 571
(4th Cir. 1998).
71. See DesRoches, 156 F.3d at 578.
72. See id. at 576-77.
73. See id. at 572.
74. 46 Va. Cir. 238 (Norfolk City 1998). One of the plaintiffs was James Allen DesRoches,
H, the plaintiff in the federal litigation described above.
75. Id. at 260-61.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the decision of the court
of appeals in Commonwealth v. Price76 that applied the state
"speedy trial" statute to compel the release of a juvenile who was
held continuously in custody for more than five months." The
Circuit Court of Fauquier County concluded in Commonwealth v.
Juvenile78 that a juvenile charged with aggravated malicious
wounding and proceeded against in a preliminary hearing pursuant
to section 16.1-269.1(B) may enter a plea of autrefois convict to bar
trial in the circuit court where the juvenile court judge concluded
that there was no probable cause to sustain the petition.79 The judge
found there was only probable cause to support the included
misdemeanor of assault and battery and retained jurisdiction with
respect to that charge and accepted a guilty plea from the defen-
dant.8 ° Thus, the Commonwealth was barred from proceeding by
direct indictment in the circuit court under section 16.1-269.1(D)."'
In Brown v. Commonwealth,82 the Virginia Court of Appeals
determined that a juvenile may be transferred for trial as an adult
pursuant to section 16.1-269.1(A) of the Virginia Code, even though
there were still appropriate services available for the youth in the
juvenile system.83 The availability of services is only one of several
criteria to be considered by the judge in exercising discretion.'
In Peeples v. Commonwealth,85 the court of appeals sitting en banc
concluded that the trial court did not err in refusing to permit
expert testimony regarding Peeples's mental state when he
76. 256 Va. 373,506 S.E.2d 317 (1998) (per curiam), afg 25 Va. App. 655,492 S.E.2d 447
(Ct. App. 1997).
77. See 256 Va. at 373, 506 S.E.2d at 317; see also VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-243 (Cum. Supp.
1999).
78. No. CR99-173 (Fauquier County Mar. 26, 1999). The record for this case is sealed
because it involves a juvenile.
79. See id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
80. See Juvenile, No. CR99-173.
81. See id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(D) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
82. No. 2858-97-2, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 182, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1999)
(unreported decision).
83. See id. at *7; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
84. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
85. No. 1261-97-2, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 550, at*1 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 5,1999), revo 28 Va.
App. 360, 504 S.E.2d 870 (Ct. App. 1998).
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committed an act of malicious wounding. 6 Although the evidence
related to defendant's mental retardation and difficulty in "inter-
preting social situations" and thus his self-defense argument, it
relied too heavily on the inexact discipline of psychiatry to diminish
his criminal responsibility."
Although not a juvenile case, the Virginia Court of Appeals
decision in Utz v. Commonwealth" is likewise significant. The court
determined that the trial judge did not err in admitting expert
testimony about street-gang culture and its characteristics as part
of the Commonwealth's case,89 which may be relevant to both the
prosecution and defense in juvenile cases. In Commonwealth v.
Williams,9" the court declined to admit testimony of prior assaults
on the victim by a juvenile being tried as an adult because Williams
was acquitted of one prior charge and the other charge's prejudicial
effect outweighed the probative value.9 In a different case, a fifteen-
year old being tried as an adult for several offenses presented
sufficient evidence to warrant an instruction on whether he was an
accessory after the fact to these offenses committed by his older
companions.92
In Richardson v. Commonwealth," the court of appeals deter-
mined that the circuit court should have allowed the juvenile's
appeal from the juvenile court's decision declining to rescind the
earlier commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice.94
Although Richardson did not appeal the original commitment order
within the required period, his appeal from the subsequent action
within the time for appeal was timely and should have been
considered on its merits.9" The court of appeals concluded in Green
86. See id. at *3.
87. See id. at *9.
88. 28 Va. App. 411, 505 S.E.2d 380 (Ct. App. 1998).
89. See id. at 427, 505 S.E.2d at 388.
90. 46 Va. Cir. 263 (Norfolk City 1998).
91. See id. at 265.
92. See Fennell v. Commonwealth, No. 2217-97-1,1999 Va. App. LEXIS 162, at *11 (Va.
Ct. App. Mar. 16, 1999) (unreported decision).
93. 28 Va. App. 389, 504 S.E.2d 884 (Ct. App. 1998).
94. See id. at 393, 504 S.E.2d at 886.
95. See id.
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v. Commonwealth96 that where the juvenile defendant was convicted
in circuit court of carjacking and use of a firearm in commission of
a carjacking, the trial court did not err in imposing the mandatory
minimum three-year sentence for the firearm offense, as that
sentence took precedence over the juvenile dispositional scheme
incorporated in section 16.1-272 of the Virginia Code." In Jackson
v. Commonwealth," however, the court of appeals decided that a
juvenile convicted in circuit court of statutory burglary and petit
larceny, not "serious" offenses under section 16.1-285.1, could
nonetheless be sentenced under sections 16.1-272(A)(2) and 16.1-
285.1. 9'
The court of appeals resolved a growing controversy in Chatman
v. Commonwealth,'00 when it determined that the insanity defense
applied in juvenile court proceedings, or in appeals of delinquency
proceedings in the circuit court, to diminish the youth's responsibil-
ity for the criminal offense.'' The court found "that the right to
assert an insanity defense is an essential [element] of 'due process
and fair treatment' which is required at a juvenile delinquency
adjudication."' The study pursuant to House Joint Resolution 680
enacted at the 1999 General Assembly Session will presumably
address the procedures to follow such a plea.'
In Niles v. Commonwealth,' the appellate court ruled that it
could not consider a claim that the trial court violated appellant's
rights by not considering"section 16.1-283" ~1 when applying section
16.1-272 because no transcript or statement of facts were filed to
96. 28 Va. App. 567, 507 S.E.2d 627 (Ct. App. 1998).
97. See Va. App. at 570, 507 S.E.2d at 629; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-272 (Repl. Vol.
1999).
98. 29 Va. App. 418, 512 S.E.2d 838 (Ct. App. 1999).
99. See id. at 424, 512 S.E.2d at 841; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285.1 (Repl. Vol.
1999).
100. No. 980-98-2, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 528, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1999)
(unreported decision).
101. See id. at *11-12.
102. Id.
103. See H.J. Res. 680, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999).
104. No. 2428-97-4, 1998 Va. App. LEXIS 553, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 1998)
(unreported decision).
105. The opinion apparently meant VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285.1 (Rep. Vol. 1999).
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permit the court to decide the issue." 6 In Hurley v. Common-
wealth, '0 the court ruled that an adult could be convicted of
distributing cocaine to a juvenile based in part on the proof derived
from the driving record of the youth that showed his birth date.'
In an old opinion recently published, a circuit court ruled that an
adult acquitted of statutory burglary could be convicted of contribut-
ing to the delinquency of two children who accompanied him at the
break-in." 9
Two Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals cases denied habeas corpus
relief and certificates of appealability to two Virginia inmates
convicted of murders committed while they were juveniles and
sentenced to death."0 In Thomas v. Taylor,"' the court ruled that
certain of the contentions were procedurally defaulted and that the
claim of the ineffective assistance of counsel was insufficient to
entitle him to relief."2 In Roach v. Angelone,"' the court found no
constitutional defect in the Supreme Court of Virginia's proportion-
ality review of the death sentence," 4 rejected the claim that Vir-
ginia's juvenile transfer procedure was unconstitutional because it
did not require a finding that the juvenile possessed the requisite
maturity and moral responsibility to be tried as an adult,"5 and
found no other constitutional deficiencies in the conviction." 6
In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville,"' the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of an injunction
against the enforcement of the Charlottesville curfew ordinance, and
concluded that the provision was constitutional." 8
106. See Niles, at *1; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-272 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
107. No. 2794-97-3,1999 Va. App. LEXIS 146, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 2,1999) (unreported
decision).
108. See id.
109. See Commonwealth v. Etheridge, 46 Va. Cir. 475 (Princess Anne County 1960).
110. See Roach v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 1999); Thomas v. Taylor, 170 F.3d 466
(4th Cir. 1999).
111. 170 F.3d 466 (4th Cir. 1999).
112. See id. at 475.
113. 176 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 1999),petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.C.W. 3153 (Aug. 30, 1999).
114. See id. at 217.
115. See id. at 224.
116. See id. at 226
117. 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998), affg 963 F. Supp. 534 (W.D. Va. 1997).
118. See id. at 845-46.
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III. ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER CARE, AND TERMINATION OF
RESIDUAL PARENTAL RIGHTS
Much of the legislative action at the 1999 General Assembly
dealing with abuse and neglect issues focused on family abuse. The
definitions in section 16.1-228 of the juvenile code were amended to
redefine "family abuse" to mean "any act involving violence, force,
or threat . . . which results in physical injury or places one in
reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury and which is
committed by a person against such person's family or household
member."" 9 The same section was amended to revise the definition
of "family or household member" to include "parents, stepparents,
children, stepchildren, brothers, sisters, grandparents and grand-
children, regardless of whether such persons reside in the same
home." 2 ° This is the definition under current law for criminal
jurisdiction of the juvenile court, but under other sections of the
Virginia Code such persons must reside in the same home to be
considered family or household members."'2 Prior law also precluded
conviction under the family assault statute of a parent who assaults
a child when the child did not reside with the parent. 22 The
amended statute imposes enhanced punishment (Class 6 felony for
a third offense) and requires the issuance of an emergency protec-
tive order whenever a warrant is issued.'23 Under certain circum-
stances, a warrantless arrest may be made for violations of the
family assault statute. 24 Section 16.1-260 was also amended to
require a juvenile and domestic relations district court intake officer
to accept and file a petition when family abuse is alleged and a
protective order is sought.'25 Legislation also amended the current
provisions that require the issuance of an emergency protective
order when a warrant is issued for assault and battery against a
119. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (Repl. Vol. 1999). The prior definition referred to "family
abuse" as an "act of violence" that had the defined effects. See id. (Repl. Vol. 1996).
120. Id. (Repl. Vol. 1999); see also id. § 16.1-241 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
121. See, e.g., VA. CODEANN. §§ 2.1-780 (Repl. Vol. 1995), 18.2-60.2 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
122. See id. § 18.2-57.2(C) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
123. See id. (Cum. Supp. 1999).
124. See id. § 19.2-81.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
125. See id. § 16.1-260(F) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
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family or household member to make the issuance of a protective
order discretionary when the defendant is a minor.'26
Amendments to several code sections accomplish the following:
increase the penalty for first offense possession of child pornography
from a Class 3 misdemeanor to a Class I misdemeanor; 1 7 punish
the use of a communication system for accomplishment of certain
sex crimes with children, as well as the production and possession
of child pornography, each as a Class 5 felony; 28 and expand the
crimes for which sex offender registration is required to include
making and possessing child pornography.'29 Another amendment
created a Class 1 misdemeanor to punish the person who, for
commercial purposes, sends any electronic file or message contain-
ing sexually explicit material that is harmful to and may be
examined by juveniles. 13 A further amendment provides that all
medical fees involved in the gathering of evidence for criminal cases
of child abuse, malicious wounding, assault and battery, and
homicide will be paid bythe Commonwealth out of the appropriation
for criminal charges.''
A birth father's consent to an adoption is no longer necessary
where the father was convicted of carnal knowledge of a child
between thirteen and fifteen years of age and the child to be adopted
was conceived as a result of the offense.' The birth father is also
barred from having a legitimate interest in the custody and
visitation of the child conceived. 33 Other legislation amended
several code sections to provide that testimony of a child victim in
a criminal or civil case may be taken by closed-circuit television if
the witness was fourteen years of age or under at the time of trial,
or if the child was fourteen years of age or under on the date of the
126. See id. §§ 16.1-253.4 (Repl. Vol. 1999), 18.2-57.2 (Cum. Supp. 1999), 19.2-81.3 (Cum.
Supp. 1999).
127. See id. § 18.2-374.1:1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
128. See id. §§ 18.2-374.2, -374.3(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
129. See id. § 19.2-298.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
130. See id. § 18.2-391(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
131. See id. § 19.2-165.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
132. See id. §§ 16.1-241(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999), 63.1-204(C) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
133. See id. §§ 63.1-220.2, -220.3(C)(7), -225(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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alleged offense and is sixteen years of age or under at the time of
trial.13
4
Persons who serve as court-appointed special advocates have been
added to the list of those professionals who are mandated to report
suspected cases of child abuse and neglect encountered in that
capacity.3 5 The penalty for a first offense of knowingly making a
false report of child abuse has been increased from a Class 4
misdemeanor to a Class 1 misdemeanor, and for a second or
subsequent offense from a Class 2 misdemeanor to a Class 6
felony. 1
36
The major piece of legislation in the child protection area in 1999
was a further manifestation of the Court Improvement Program
enhancing permanency planning for children in foster care as a
result of voluntary entrustment or a parental petition for relief of
custody."' Two new code sections separate the handling of petitions
for approval of entrustment agreements and petitions for relief of
care and custody, clarify the procedural and substantive require-
ments related to filing such petitions, and make uniform with other
provisions the treatment of children who come into foster care
through these proceedings. 13 The legislation also establishes several
new procedural requirements. The agency to which a child is
entrusted must file a petition no later than the last day of the
entrustment period for approval of an agreement for fewer than
ninety days, if the child does not go home within the entrustment
period. 39 A foster care plan must be filed for a hearing pursuant to
section 16.1-281 with any petition for approval of an entrustment
agreement. 4 ° A guardian ad litem is appointed to represent the
child and the matter is set for a hearing within forty-five days.'
The new standard for the court's approval is that the entrustment
134. See id. §§ 16.1-252(D) (Repl. Vol. 1999), 18.2-67.9(A)(Cum. Supp. 1999), 63.1-248.13:1
(Cur. Supp. 1999).
135. See id. §§ 9-173.8(A)(5) (Cur. Supp. 1999), 63.1-248.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
136. See id. § 63.1-248.5:1.01(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
137. See id. §§ 16.1-277.01 to -277.2, -278.3, -282 to -282.1, -283 (Repl. Vol. 1999), 63.1-56,
-204 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
138. See id. §§ 16.1-277.01 to -277.02 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
139. See id. § 16.1-277.01(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
140. See id. § 16.1-277.01(A)(3) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
141. See id. § 16.1-277.01(B) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
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agreement is in the best interests of the child." Entry of an order
approving a permanent entrustment agreement has the effect of
terminating the parent's rights and renders the agreement irrevoca-
ble.143 An Adoption Progress Report, outlining the agency's progress
toward finalizing a child's adoption, is required in all parental rights
termination cases.' The guardian ad litem appointment continues
in juvenile court until a final order of adoption is entered. 45 Prior to
the first hearing, a petition for relief of care and custody of a child
must be referred to the local department of social services for
investigation and provision of any appropriate services to prevent
out-of-home placement.'46 Notice to a parent who is not a petitioner
for permanent relief of care and custody of a child and termination
of parental rights must be provided and termination of that parent's
parental rights must be in accordance with section 16.1-283.' The
petitioner must establish good cause for relief of care and custody of
a child. 48 Several additional dispositional alternatives are available
to the court in handling a petition for relief of care and custody.149
If the court makes a finding, but does not dispose of the matter at
the first hearing, a dispositional hearing must be held within
seventy-five days of the initial hearing. 5 ' An appeal may be taken
from a final order. 5 '
The Virginia Court of Appeals ruled in Fairfax County Depart-
ment of Family Services v. D.N. and S.N.5 that the jurisdiction of
a circuit court in hearing an appeal from a juvenile court's finding
of abuse and neglect is derivative.' The circuit court can hear all
relevant evidence under the jurisdictional predicate, and thus the
court can consider other evidence of abuse and neglect other than
142. See id. § 16.1-277.01(D) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
143. See id.
144. See id. § 16.1-277.01(E) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
145. See id.
146. See id. § 16.1-277.02(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
147. See id.
148. See id. § 16.1-277.02(C) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
149. See id.
150. See id. § 16.1-277.02 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
151. See id.
152. 29 Va. App. 400, 512 S.E.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1999).
153. See id. at 405, 512 S.E.2d at 832.
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that heard by the juvenile court in making its finding.5 4 In an
unpublished decision, the court upheld an adjudication of abuse and
neglect resulting in the removal of children from their mother's
home in spite of an administrative hearing officer's determination
of the level of abuse, and over an objection that the action violated
her legal rights as a disabled person.'55 In Richmond Department of
Social Services v. Carter,'56 the court of appeals ruled that the
Department of Social Services's ("DSS") standard of proof in
proposing to change the goals in a foster care plan is "preponderance
of the evidence" and not "clear and convincing" evidence, even where
the changed goal would be adoption of the child.'57 A circuit court
concluded that a court can approve a foster care plan for only six
months at a time under the juvenile code regardless of what might
be in the best interests of a child.'
Courts continue to struggle with administrative findings of abuse
and neglect after investigations of complaints. In Carter v.
Gordon,"9 the court of appeals concluded that the evidence sup-
ported the DSS's findings of sexual abuse in the investigation of
complaints against an elementary school teacher. 6 ° Likewise, in
Eggleston v. Virginia Department of Social Services,'6' the DSS's
findings were upheld in spite of inconsistencies in the victim's
statements. 62 The DSS was not required to accept the proffered
results of a polygraph examination. 63 In Perry v. Carter," the court
of appeals upheld a trial court's action ordering the amendment of
department records to "unfounded" because of an invalid notice of
the right to appeal over the objection of the subject who desired a
different basis for purging the records and who unsuccessfully
154. See id. at 405-06, 512 S.E.2d at 832.
155. Plotkin v. Fairfax County Dep't of Family Servs., No. 0085-98-4, 1998 Va. App. LEXIS
535, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 1998) (unreported decision).
156. 28 Va. App. 494, 507 S.E.2d 87 (Ct. App. 1998).
157. See id. at 498, 507 S.E.2d at 88.
158. See In re Hurdle, 47 Va. Cir. 409 (Richmond City 1998).
159. 28 Va. App. 133, 502 S.E.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1998).
160. See id. at 148, 502 S.E.2d at 704.
161. No. 670-98-3, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 166, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 1999)
(unreported decision).
162. See id. at *8.
163. See id. at *9.
164. No. 1366-98-1, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 73, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 1999) (unreported
decision).
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sought attorneys fees.165 In another case, the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that a circuit court had ruled correctly in examining
a local department's files in camera and ordering release of the
records to the subject of a complaint after he alleged bad faith and
malicious intent in the making of the complaint.
1 66
Termination of parental rights cases continue to proliferate on the
Virginia Court of Appeals docket although there are fewer published
cases. In Padilla v. Norfolk Division of Social Services,16 the court
upheld the termination of a mother's parental rights where the
evidence showed her child was severely developmentally delayed
when placed in foster care at seven months of age and that the child
had progressed significantly over the intervening six years with the
foster family (although still with problems). 6 ' Other evidence
illustrated that the mother had persistent psychological problems,
and that a former court-appointed special advocate gave a recom-
mendation in favor of termination.'69 Likewise, in Elkins v. Depart-
ment of Social Services for the County of Campbell,170 the court
upheld a termination of parental rights where the mother suffered
from a severe emotional disorder that impaired her ability to care
properly for her children.171 The resulting neglect pregented a
serious threat to the children that was unlikely to be corrected. 2 In
another case, the court concluded that the trial court had adequately
explored the possibility of placement with relatives and had
sufficiently assessed whether the children were of an age of
discretion before concluding they were not.
7 1
165. See id. at *3, *9.
166. See Gloucester County Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Kennedy, 256 Va. 400, 404,507 S.E.2d
81, 83 (1998).
167. No. 1388-98-1,1999 Va. App. LEXIS 48, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 26,1999) (per curiam)
(unreported decision).
168. See id. at *7 (A therapist testified that the removal from the foster family would be
detrimental to him.).
169. See id.
170. No. 1878-98-3,1999 Va. App. LEXIS 47, at*1 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 26,1999) (per curiam)
(unreported decision).
171. See id. at *6.
172. See id. at *5.
173. See Fuller v. Virginia Beach Dep't ofSoc. Servs., No. 2610-97-1, 1998 Va. App. LEXIS
391 (Va. Ct. App. July 7, 1998) (unreported decision).
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The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's termina-
tion of rights in Kenny v. Richmond Department of Social Services,
where the mother's parenting skills had not improved during the six
years her daughter had been in foster care and the mother's
emotional and intellectual levels were quite low.' 5 The court of
appeals rejected the assertion on appeal that there had been no
finding by the trial court that the daughter was of an age of
discretion because the issue was not raised below.176 The termina-
tion of parental rights was affirmed in Conner v. Arlington County
Department of Social Services.177 The child had been placed in foster
care at the age of eight because he was found accompanying his
mother while she was shoplifting. 7 ' He could not read, write, or
recognize numbers, and he had been taught to lie and steal by his
mother.179 The mother did not cooperate with attempted therapy
and failed to attend counseling sessions over the three years
preceding the termination proceedings.' 80
The court of appeals affirmed termination in Whittaker v. Roanoke
County Department of Social Services,18 where the evidence showed
that the ten-year-old daughter had severe emotional problems as a
result of her abuse and neglect, had multiple foster care placements,
had engaged in self-destructive acts, and had expressed suicidal
thoughts.'82 In Allen v. Lynchburg Division of Social Services,8 '
termination was upheld where the child was placed in foster care at
the age of two because of persistent neglect caused by the mother's
substance abuse and beatings by the child's stepfather." Six years
174. No. 1483-97-2, 1998 Va. App. LEXIS 377, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. June 30, 1998)
(unreported decision).
175. See id. at *2.
176. See id.
177. No. 046-98-4,1998 Va. App. LEXIS 477, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 9,1998) (per curiam)
(unreported decision).
178. See id. at *4.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. No. 1650-98-3, 1998 Va. App. LEXIS 649, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 1998) (per
curiam) (unreported decision).
182. See id. at *4.
183. No. 1209-98-3, 1998 Va. App. LEXIS 648, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 1998) (per
curiam) (unreported decision).
184. See id. at *4.
1020
LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING CHILDREN
later there had been no improvement in the mother's ability to care
for or protect the child.185 A divided court of appeals panel affirmed
the termination of the mother's parental rights in Gallupe v.
Roanoke City Department of Social Services,'86 where she refused to
believe the allegations of sexual abuse against the father in spite of
overwhelming evidence, blamed the children for the breakup of the
family, and would not protect the children from the father."8 7 In a
different case, a circuit court declined to terminate the parental
rights of a couple where the department presented no direct
evidence of the alleged sexual abuse and did not establish by clear
and convincing evidence that the conditions leading to removal of
the children could not be corrected.' 8
The flood of criminal prosecutions for abuse and neglect continues
unabated. In Krampen v. Commonwealth,8 9 the court of appeals
concluded that the defendant could be convicted of taking indecent
liberties with a child in violation of section 18.2-370.1 because the
mother's entrustment of the victim to him for transporting the child
to and from church placed him in "a custodial or supervisory
relationship."9 ° Such status does not require any formal legal
custodial relationship. Similarly, a therapist was acting in a
"custodial or supervisory relationship" when he took sexually
explicit photographs of a girl he was counseling during the time she
was entrusted to his care. 9 ' In Woodson v. Commonwealth,192 the
court ruled that the defendant was a "person responsible" for the
victim's care under section 18.2-371.1 where he lived in the same
house and exercised authority over him and he thus could be
convicted of neglecting the boy.'93 However, in Kisling v. Common-
185. See id. at*5.
186. No. 0515-98-3, 1998 Va. App. LEXIS 651, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 1998) (per
curiam) (unreported decision).
187. See id. at *3.
188. See Department of Family Servs. v. Desouza, 45 Va. Cir. 48 (Fairfax County 1998).
189. 29 Va. App. 163, 510 S.E.2d 276 (Ct. App. 1999).
190. Id. at 166, 510 S.E.2d at 278; see also VA- CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.1 (Rep. Vol. 1996).
191. DeAmicis v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 751, 756-57, 514 S.E.2d 788, 791 (Ct. App.
1999).
192. No. 140-98-2,1999 Va. App. LEXIS 142, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 2,1999) (unreported
decision).
193. See id. at *3; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.1 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
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wealth, 9' the court found insufficient proof of a "custodial or
supervisory relationship" where the seventeen-year-old victim was
living as a guest in Kisling's home and where Kisling did not have
any legal or actual authority over the girl. 9 ' The court of appeals
ruled in Ellis v. Commonwealth9 ' that a mother could not be
convicted of criminal neglect where she left her two young children
alone napping in an apartment while she visited a friend for thirty
minutes in another apartment.'97 The girls were injured in a fire
because the mother left the gas stove on, but there was no proof of
the requisite criminal intent to support the convictions.'98
In Castelow v. Commonwealth,'99 the court of appeals ruled that
a girl's complaint of sexual abuse made sixteen months after it
occurred was erroneously admitted into evidence because there was
no explanation for the extraordinary delay.2"' Evidence of a "fresh
complaint" of sexual abuse is not admissible without the victim's
testimony because such evidence is admissible only as
corroboration.2"' The rape shield statute20 2 precludes the cross-
examination of a minor rape victim regarding her false denial of
prior vaginal sexual intercourse.0 3 In a different case, the court of
appeals, sitting en banc, found evidence that the defendant taught
his nine-year-old niece how to run her hairbrush back and forth on
her "pookie," coupled with testimony that the girl had constant
irritation of her vagina and a swollen clitoris, was sufficient to
establish circumstantially that the victim's labia majora was
penetrated.2 ' In Siquina v. Commonwealth,"5 the court concluded
194. No. 0169-98-3, 1998 WL 886963, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 1998) (unreported
decision).
195. See id. at *1.
196. 29 Va. App. 548, 513 S.E.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1999).
197. See id. at 555, 513 S.E.2d at 456-57.
198. See id. at 557, 513 S.E.2d at 458.
199. 29 Va. App. 305, 512 S.E.2d 137 (Ct. App. 1999).
200. See id. at 313, 512 S.E.2d 141.
201. See Commonwealth v. Wills, 44 Va. Cir. 459, 460 (Spotsylvania County 1998).
202. See Va. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
203. See Thompson v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 543,547,507 S.E.2d 110,112 (Ct. App.
1998).
204. See Jett v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 190, 510 S.E.2d 747 (Ct. App. 1999), afftg 27
Va. App. 759, 501 S.E.2d 457 (Ct. App. 1998).
205. 28 Va. App. 694, 508 S.E.2d 350 (Ct. App. 1998).
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that a person could be convicted of "exposing" sexual or genital parts
to a child even though the child did not actually see them.0 6
The court of appeals found the necessary element of force or
intimidation missing in a case charging animate object sexual
penetration where the teenage victim appeared to be acquiescing in
the behavior.0 7 InPenley v. Commonwealth,0 8 the court of appeals
concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish Penley's guilt
of attempted taking of indecent liberties with children where he
asked two girls awaiting their school bus if they had "ever seen a
dick before" and if they "would like to see one."2 9 Another defen-
dant, appealing his conviction for sexually abusing his four-year-old
daughter, was held to have waived his appellate claims by pleading
guilty.210 In Roberts v. Commonwealth,1 1 the court found that the
evidence of felony child neglect was sufficient where the mother
neglected to get necessary medical treatment for her four-year-old
child who had serious physical injuries. 12 The court deemed the
evidence sufficient despite her claim that she lacked criminal intent
because she feared her boyfriend. 13 On the other hand, the court of
appeals reversed a similar conviction where a mother failed to take
her son to get medical attention when she noticed injuries he
suffered while he was with a babysitter. 4
IV. EDUCATION
Much of the legislative action concerning education continued to
focus on weapons and drugs in schools, as well as on the threats of
violence, even prior to the shootings in Littleton, Colorado. Educa-
206. See id.
207. See Adsit v. Commonwealth, No. 0882-98-2, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 86, at *1 (Va. Ct.
App. Feb. 9, 1999) (unreported decision).
208. No. 188-97-2,1998'Va. App. LEXIS 472, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 8,1998) (unreported
decision).
209. Id. at *2, *5.
210. See Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 563,566,507 S.E.2d 625, 627 (Ct. App.
1998).
211. No. 1594-98-3, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 323, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. June 8, 1999)
(unreported decision).
212. See id. at *5.
213. See id. at *6.
214. See McBeth v. Commonwealth, No. 1096-98-2, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS, at *1 (Va. Ct.
App. June 29, 1999) (unpublished decision).
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tion itself, however, was a major emphasis in this election year for
the entire General Assembly.215 One piece of legislation expanded
the list of weapons prohibited on school property to include knives
with metal blades of three inches or longer.216 Two bills addressed
firearms possession on school grounds, 17 and one eliminated the
prior exception from the statute requiring expulsion of students for
bringing firearms onto school property or to a school-sponsored
activity.218 The prior exception was for possession of an unloaded
firearm in a closed container in or upon a motor vehicle, or an
unloaded shotgun or rifle in a firearms rack in or upon a car.9
Other action modified the "zero tolerance" provision of the law,
which mandated one year expulsions for students bringing weapons
on school property or to school-sponsored events.220 The modification
would permit School Boards, by regulation, to authorize the division
superintendent or his designee to conduct a preliminary review in
such cases to determine whether a disciplinary action other than
expulsion is appropriate.22' These regulations are to ensure that any
"other" subsequent disciplinary action is to be taken in accordance
with the due process procedures set forth in the Virginia Code.222
The school administrator or a School Board, pursuant to School
Board policy, may determine, based on the facts of a particular
situation, that special circumstances exist and that no disciplinary
action, some other disciplinary action, or another term of expulsion
is appropriate.223 Similar action was taken in the "zero tolerance"
provision concerning the possession of drugs on school property or
at a school-sponsored activity.224 Currently, possession with intent
to manufacture, sell, or distribute is the basis for required expul-
215. This discussion will not try to address all the education bills enacted at the 1999
Session, but will only deal with selected pieces of legislation.
216. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999). Butter knives and other
implements used for food consumption or preparation are excluded from the prohibition. See
id.
217. See id. §§ 18.2-308.1, 22.1-277.01 (Cure. Supp. 1999).
218. See id. § 22.1-277.01 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
219. See id. § 22.1-277.01(A) (Cum. Supp. 1997).




224. See id. § 22.1-277.01:1 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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sion." As noted above, the Board of Education is directed to
develop, in consultation with the Office of the Attorney General,
guidelines for strip searches in public schools. 226 A report on the
guidelines is to be made to the General Assembly.227
The drug-free school zones law was amended to add designated
school bus stops, and any public property or property open to public
use within 1,000 feet of any such school bus stop, to the sites in
which it is unlawful to conduct drug activities. 228 Such activities
include the manufacture, sale, or distribution, or possession with
intent to sell, give, or distribute any controlled substance, imitation
controlled substance, or marijuana.229 The drug-free zone would be
in effect during the times school children are waiting to be picked up
or are being dropped off.Another amendment permits local law
enforcement authorities to report to school principals regarding
student offenses that would be a felony if committed by an adult, or
would be an adult misdemeanor involving any of the at-school drug,
weapons, or violence-related incidents already required to be
reported to school officials.2 1 Principals are to contact the parents
of students involved in these incidents, and the student must
participate in appropriate intervention and prevention activities.232
A principal who knowingly fails to comply or secure compliance with
these reporting requirements will be subject to sanctions prescribed
by the local School Board. 3 These sections may include, but need
not be limited to, demotion or dismissal.234
A further amendment authorizes School Boards to adopt
regulations empowering the division superintendent or his designee
to require certain students to attend alternative education programs
after written notice is given to the student and his parent.2 5 The
225. See id. § 22.1-227.01:2(A) (Cam. Supp. 1999).
226. See id. § 22.1-227.01:2 (Cm. Supp. 1999).
227. See id.
228. See id. § 18.2-255.2(A)(iv) (Cm. Supp. 1999).
229. See id. § 18.2-255.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
230. See id. § 18.2-255.2(A)(iv) (Cam. Supp. 1999).
231. See id. § 22.1-280.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
232. See id. § 22.1-280.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id. § 22.1-277.1(A) (Cam. Supp. 1999).
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student or his parent must also be notified of the opportunity to
participate in a hearing conducted by the division superintendent or
his designee regarding such alternative education placementY 6 The
decision of the superintendent or his designee would be final unless
altered by the School Board."' It could be altered upon timely
written petition by the student or his parent for a review of the
record by the School Board.2 3 ' The affected students include those
who have been
(i) charged with an offense relating to the laws, or with a violation of
school board policies, on weapons, alcohol or drugs, or intentional
injury to another person; (ii) found guilty of a crime which resulted in
or could have resulted in injury to others, or of a crime for which the
court disposition is required to be disclosed to the superintendent of
the school division; or (iii) expelled [for weapons offenses or convictions
or adjudications of delinquency related to certain serious crimes]. 9
The General Assembly also established grants for pilot discretion-
ary programs for disruptive elementary and middle school students
who do not qualify for the alternative education programs estab-
lished in section 22.1-209.1:2.240 A "disruptive student" is defined as
one, "whose behavior interrupts or obstructs the learning environ-
ment and results in two or more short-term suspensions or requires
repeated intervention by school personnel." '
The Board [of Education] shall establish criteria for these pilot
discretionary programs which shall require innovative approaches to
resolving common disciplinary problems which occur among disruptive
elementary and middle school students, such as nontraditional
physical plants or locations or courses, family involvement and
participation, and nontraditional attendance patterns. All such
innovative approaches shall require, as a condition of enrollment,
written agreements for parental involvement and participation in the
programs.
242
236. See id. § 22.1-277.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. Id. § 22.1-277.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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Another innovation established the Community-Based Interven-
tion Program for Suspended and Expelled Students to provide
interim instruction, intervention, and supervision for students in
the public schools who are suspended or expelled from regular
school attendance. 3 Participants will be either recommended for
the program, ordered into the program by a court, or enrolled by the
parent.' The program shall consist of five regional projects and
must include a structured and balanced educational program that
accommodates the specific needs of the students. 5
Several amendments to the education laws deal with truancy as
a result of the Commission on Youth study."4 One comprehensive
bill makes a number of revisions to the truancy and compulsory
school attendance statutes. 7 The measure (i) allows intake officers
to proceed informally on a complaint alleging a child is in need of
services, supervision, or is delinquent in certain instances involving
violations of certain school attendance requirements; (ii) requires
attendance officers, in addition to making a reasonable effort to
notify the parent of the pupil's absence, to obtain an explanation for
the absence;249 (iii) requires principals or their designees, after a
pupil has been absent for five days for the school year without
indication of the parent's awareness and support of such absence, to
make a reasonable effort to ensure that direct contact is made with
the parent by the attendance officer to obtain an explanation and
explain to the parent the consequences of continued
nonattendance;25 ' (iv) requires the attendance officer, the pupil, and
the pupil's parent to jointly develop a plan to resolve the pupil's
nonattendance;" 1 (v) requires a conference to be scheduled, after an
additional unexcused absence, to resolve issues related to the
243. See id. § 22.1-209.1:9(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
244. See iU. § 22.1-209.1:9(B) (Cure. Supp. 1999).
245. See id. § 22.1-209.1:9(C) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
246. See REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA CONMISSION ON YOUTH STUDY OF TRUANTS AND
RUNAWAYS, H. Doc. No. 57 (1999); see also VA. CODEANN. §§ 16.1-260, 22.1-258, -260 to -263
(Cum. Supp. 1999).
247. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-260, 22.1-258, -260 to -263 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
248. See id. § 16.1-260(B) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
249. See id. § 22.1-261 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
250. See id. § 22.1-258 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
251. See id.
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nonattendance;252 (vi) empowers attendance officers to enforce these
new provisions by making a complaint alleging the student is a child
in need of supervision or instituting proceedings against the parent
relating to violations of the compulsory school attendance law; 3
(vii) directs school principals to report annually the number of
pupils by grade level for whom a conference between the pupil, his
parent, and school personnel has been scheduled because of no
indication that the pupil's parent is aware of and supports the
pupil's sixth unexplained absence;254 and (viii) makes initial
violations of the various nonattendance trigger days, plan, and
conference requirements a Class 3 misdemeanor and subsequent or
knowing and willful violations a Class 2 misdemeanor.2 55
A second bill authorizes law enforcement officers and attendance
officers who pick up a public school student for truancy to deliver
the child to the appropriate public school or a truancy center.2 6
"'[T]ruancy center' means a facility or site operated by a school
division, sometimes jointly with the local law-enforcement agency,
and designated for receiving children who have been retrieved by a
[police] officer or attendance officer for truancy from school." 7 The
prior Virginia Code section only contemplated the delivery of these
students to the appropriate school.2 8 Immunity from civil liability
is also provided for acts or omissions relating to the pickup and
delivery of truant public school children.25 9 This bill also provides
that a minor in violation of local curfew ordinances may now be
proceeded against as a child in need of supervision, rather than as
a "status offender."2 6' Related legislation amends the compulsory
school attendance laws authorizing local School Boards to allow
compulsory attendance requirements to be satisfied for any student
sixteen years of age and older, upon a meeting between the student,
the student's parents, and the principal or his designee, in which an
252. See id.
253. See id. § 22.1-262 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
254. See id. § 22.1-260(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
255. See id. § 22.1-263 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
256. See id. § 22.1-266 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
257. Id. § 22.1-266(C) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
258. See id. § 22.1-266 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
259. See id. § 22.1-266(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
260. See id.
1028
LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING CHILDREN
individual student alternative education plan ("ISAEP") is developed
in conformity with guidelines prescribed by the Board.261 The plan
must include career guidance counseling, mandatory enrollment in
a GED testing program (or other alternative education program
approved by the local School Board), counseling on the economic
impact of failing to complete high school, and provisions for
reenrollment in school.26 2 Such students must take the GED test.
2 63
From appropriated funds, local School Boards must implement GED
testing and preparatory programs consistent with guidelines to be
developed by the Board of Education 4.2 The guidelines must include
a provision allowing such preparatory and testing programs to be
offered jointly by two or more School BoardsY.2 5 The amendment
provides that no one under sixteen is eligible for GED testing
programs and a student who fails to comply with his ISAEP shall be
deemed to be in violation of compulsory attendance requirements. 6
Additionally, students enrolled with a plan shall be counted in the
average daily membership in the relevant school division. Other
amendments provide that home-schooled students need not have
three consecutive years of home instruction to be eligible to take the
GED test.2 68
Another 1999 bill revised the statute controlling who is entitled
to free public education in the school divisions of the Common-
wealth.6 ' The statute adds those persons of school age whose
parents are unable to care for them and who are living within the
school division (not solely for school purposes) with another person
who resides in the school division where the person with whom they
reside is acting in loco parentis pursuant to placement of the
school-age person for adoption by an authorized person or entity.
2 70
A similar enactment provides criteria for determining residency for
261. See id. § 22.1-254 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
262. See id.; see also id. §§ 16.1-278.4,22.1-199.1, -253.13:1, -254, -254.01, -254.1, -254.2,
-263, -271.4 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
263. See id. § 22.1-254(D)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
264. See id. § 22.1-254.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
265. See id.
266. See id. § 22.1-254.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
267. See id. § 22.1-253.13.1(H) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
268. See id. § 22.1-251.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
269. See id. § 22.1-3 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
270. See id.
1999] 1029
1030 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1001
school attendance when property is divided by a jurisdictional
line."' These criteria establish that a person residing within
housing or temporary shelter situated in more than one school
division shall be deemed to reside in and shall be entitled to attend
a public school within either school division." '7 However, if a person
resides in housing or temporary shelter that is located in one school
division, but the property on which such housing or temporary
shelter is located lies within more than one school division, such
person shall be deemed to reside only in the single school division in
which the housing or temporary shelter is located." 3 Local School
Boards are to adopt regulations governing tuition charged to certain
nonresident and underage students consistent with this provision. 4
After several years of attempts, legislation was finally enacted to
allow local School Boards to adopt procedures for the appointment
of student representatives from among the students enrolled in the
public schools in the division. 5 "The student representative will
serve in a nonvoting, advisory capacity and [will] be appointed
under such circumstances and serve for such terms as the board
prescribes."7 6 The School Board may exclude the nonvoting student
representative from executive sessions or closed meetings pursuant
to the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, and the representa-
tive must not be construed to be a member of the local School Board
for any purpose, including but not limited to, establishing a quorum
or making any official decision.
The Education Accountability and Quality Enhancement Act of
1999279 makes several changes to the statutes that govern teacher
preparation, evaluation, and employment, including
(i) requiring each local school board to evaluate its division superintendent




274. See id. § 22.1-5 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
275. See id. § 22.1-86.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
276. Id.
277. See id. § 221.1-86.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
278. See id. § 22.1-86.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
279. Act of May 7, 1999, ch. 1030, 1999 Va. Acts 2730.
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uniform performance standards and criteria to be used by local school boards
in evaluating superintendents; (iii) establishing the National Teacher
Certification Reward Program to provide annual monetary awards to
teachers achieving and maintaining national certification; (iv) amending
Standard 5 of the Standards of Quality to incorporate specific training for
administrative and supervisory personnel in the evaluation and
documentation of training in evaluation and documentation of teacher and
administrator performance; (v) requiring local school boards to develop for
use by division superintendents a performance evaluation process for
principals, assistant principals, and supervisors; (vi) requiring school boards
to fill teaching positions with licensed instructional personnel qualified in
the relevant subject areas; (vii) directing school boards to include in their
teacher employment policies incentives for excellence in teaching, and to
develop a procedure for use by the division superintendent and principals in
evaluating instructional personnel; (viii) requiring the Board of Education
to require persons seeking initial licensure on and after July 1, 2003, to
complete study in instructional methods tailored to promote student
achievement and effective preparation for the Standards of Learning
end-of-course and end-of-grade assessments and to submit materials
evidencing proficiency in classroom instruction and to require persons
renewing licenses on and after July 1, 2004, to receive training in
instructional methods promoting academic progress and effective
preparation for the SOL tests; (ix) directing Virginia's public colleges and
universities to use a professional teacher's examination prescribed by the
Board of Education for persons seeking entry into teacher education
programs and to report annually, pursuantto Board ofEducation guidelines,
performance reports that include pass rates of graduates taking the state
teacher licensure examination; (x) directing school boards to provide mentor
teachers to probationary teachers, except probationary teachers who have
prior successful teaching experience; (xi) requiring annual evaluations of
probationary teachers; and (xii) specifying various guidelines for the Mentor
Teacher Program." °
A new mandate requires all School Boards to establish character
education programs in cooperation with students, parents, and the
communityY The basic character traits may include trustworthi-
ness, respect, responsibility (including hard work and economic
self-reliance), fairness (including consequences of bad behavior and
principles of nondiscrimination), caring, and citizenship (including
280. S.B. 1145, Teacher Certification Incentive Reward Program: Summary as Passed
(visited Sept. 17,1999) <http'//legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/>; see also VA. CODEANN. §§ 22.1-60.1,
-253.13:5, -293, -294, -295, -298, -299.2, -303, -303.1, -305, -305.1, 23-9.2:3.4 (Cum. Supp.
1999).
281. See VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-208.01 (Cam. Supp. 1999).
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patriotism, the Pledge of Allegiance, and respect for the American
flag), each of which subsumes various characteristics such as
honesty, integrity, tolerance, and accountability.282
Two United States Supreme Court decisions impacted the possible
liability of local school divisions for student-on-student sexual
harassment and for services for disabled students. In Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education,8 3 the Court concluded that a
private damages action under Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972 may exist for peer sexual harassment of a student in
a public school receiving federal funds, at least under certain
circumstances. 4 Those circumstances are limited to when the
recipient of federal funds "acts with deliberate indifference to known
acts of harassment in its programs or activities," and where the
harassment "is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that
it effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity
or benefit."2 5 Thus, the decision of the district court dismissing the
proceedings and of the court of appeals affirmingthat determination
were reversed.8 6 The Court seems to equate sexual harassment
with other types of student-on-student physical assaults, but the
high bar established should discourage frivolous cases presenting
isolated instances of teasing or similar minor incidents. In Cedar
Rapids Community School District v. Garret F.,287 the Court held
that continuous professional nursing care must be provided to a
disabled student under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act ("IDEA") where that care represents a "related service" enabling
a student to have meaningful access to public educationY Justice
John Paul Stevens, writing for the majority, stated that
[t]his case is about whether meaningful access to the public schools will
be assured, not the level of education that a school must finance once
access is attained. It is undisputed that the services at issue must be
provided if Garret is to remain in school. Under the statute, our
precedent, and the purposes of the IDEA, the District must fund such
282. See id.
283. 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
284. See id. at 1666; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
285. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1666.
286. See id. at 1666, 1676.
287. 119 S. Ct. 992 (1999).
288. See id. at 1000; see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1994).
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"related services" in order to help guarantee that students like Garret
are integrated into the public schools.'
In Manning v. Fairfax County School Board,90 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that Virginia's
one year statute of limitations governing personal actions was also
applicable to the filing of administrative proceedings under the
IDEA.29 In Erickson v. Board of Education of Baltimore County,2 92
the court ruled that an attorney cannot recover fees pursuant to the
IDEA for the representation of his own son in proceedings to secure
education services under the Act.
293
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled in Wagoner v. Benson294 that
the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar a suit on behalf of
a child injured when struck by an automobile while crossing the
street to board a school bus, where the School Board's liability
insurance policy covers the accident and section 22.1-194 of the
Virginia Code applies.295 In Newman v. Erie Insurance Exchange,296
the Supreme Court of Virginia overruled a prior case by deciding
that a child struck by an automobile while crossing the road to
board a school bus, while the bus's specialized safety equipment was
activated, was "using" the school bus within the meaning of the
language in a School Board's insurance policy.297 In another case,
the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed a lower court's award of
summary judgment in a case to allow parents to conduct discovery
with regard to their claim that a liquidated damages clause in a
private school tuition contract was an unenforceable penalty.
298
289. Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist., 119 S. Ct. at 1000.
290. 176 F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 1999).
291. See id. at 239.
292. 162 F.3d 289 (4th Cir. 1998).
293. See id. at 290; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B) (1994).
294. 256 Va. 260, 505 S.E.2d 188 (1998).
295. See id. at 262, 264, 505 S.E.2d at 188, 190; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-194 (Repl.
Vol. 1997). Section 22.1-194 of the Virginia Code abrogates a School Board's sovereign
immunity to the extent of the coverage of a liability insurance policy in force to cover the
complainant's injury. See id.
296. 256 Va. 501, 507 S.E.2d 348(1998).
297. See id. at 509,507 S.E.2d at 352. The decision overruled Stern v. Cincinnati Ins. Co.,
252 Va. 307,477 S.E.2d 517 (1996). See id.
298. See O'Brian v. Langley Sch., 256 Va. 547, 549, 552, 507 S.E.2d 363, 364, 366 (1998).
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V. MISCELLANEOUS
An amendment to the Comprehensive Services Act for At-Risk
Youth and Families ("CSA") added oversight responsibilities to the
State Executive Council to improve review of services provided to
children under the Act by making the Council responsible for the
following: overseeing implementation of a uniform assessment
instrument, development of case management standards, and
adoption of other quality assurance measures, and authority to
withhold funding to local management teams that did not comply
with the Act.299 Localities would be required to use multidisciplinary
teams in developing treatment plans, except for routine foster care
cases."° Another amendment to the Act allows parents who are
employed by public or private programs that receive CSA funds, or
agencies represented on a community and policy management team,
to be parent representatives on community policy and management
teams and family assessment and planning teams, provided that
they do not interact directly on a regular basis with the children. ° '
Foster parents also may serve as parent representatives." 2 Current
law prohibits parents employed by these entities from being parent
representatives.3 3
Significant legislation revised the laws applicable to a guardian-
ship of a minor's estate to update the code provisions so that they
conform with current practical considerations raised by attorneys,
guardians, minors, and the courts.0 4 This makes a guardianship
similar to a typical minor's trust insofar as the guardian's adminis-
trative and distributive powers are concerned.305 Additionally, court
decisions were incorporated into the law, prohibiting the use of a
minor's assets for the support of the minor when the minor has a
parent who is under a duty to support the minor and is capable of
299. See VA. CODEANN. §§ 2.1-746, -751, -752, -754, -755, -757,-758,16.1-286 (Cum. Supp.
1999).
300. See id. § 2.1-752 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
301. See id. §§ 2.1-751, -753 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
302. See id. § 2.1-753 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
303. See id.
304. See id. § 26-17.4 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
305. See id. §§ 26-17.4, 31-1 to -9, -14 to -14.1, -18.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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providing such support."0 6 A commissioner of accounts for the
jurisdiction wherein a guardian qualifies may authorize distribu-
tions without court approval provided the total distributions
authorized in any one year shall not exceed $3,000.307 The commis-
sioner must, in his report to the court on the guardian's next
accounting, explain the necessity for the distributions so
authorized.30 " The changes were developed to parallel the recent
enactment of legislation relating to incapacitated adults, including
a new approach to fiduciary powers, eliminating distinctions
between realty and personalty, and placing the focus of distributions
on the needs of the minor. °9
Several bills addressed driver's licenses and learner's permits for
310 Oeblminors. One bill provided that parents waiving the requirement
that their child be in academic good standing and regularly
attending school to obtain a driver's license or learner's permit
indicate their authorization on forms provided by and at the
Department of Motor Vehicles.3 11 A second bill provided that the
evidence of successful completion of a driver's education course,
signed by the minor's parent or guardian, together with the minor's
learner's permit, constitute a temporary driver's license.3 "2 A third
bill provided that only custodial parents have the ability to request
that the Division of Motor Vehicles cancel their child's driver's
license. 3
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Montalvo v.
Radcliffe 4 that a martial arts school did not violate Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act by denying admission to a twelve-
year-old boy who was HIV-positive. 3 5 The youth's "condition posed
a significant risk to the health or safety of other students and no
reasonable modification could sufficiently reduce this risk without
306. See id. § 31-8.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
307. See id. § 31-8.2 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
308. See id.
309. See id. §§ 31-8 to -8.2 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
310. See id. §§ 46.2-334 to -335 (Cure. Supp. 1999).
311. See id. §§ 46.2-334(A)(4) to -335(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
312. See id. § 46.2-334(D) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
313. See id. § 46.2-334(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
314. 167 F.3d 873 (4th Cir. 1999).
315. See id. at 879; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
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fundamentally altering the nature of the program."316 The Supreme
Court of Virginia held that a mother may not sue a hospital for
negligent infliction of emotional distress caused by observing her
daughter's physical reactions to the overdose of a drug administered
by the hospital during medical tests because the hospital owed no
duty to the mother.317
The Supreme Court of Virginia also decided two charitable
immunity cases. In Bailey v. Lancaster Ruritan Recreation Center,
Inc., 318 the court concluded that the center was not protected by
charitable immunity from a suit for wrongful death filed by a
mother whose daughter drowned while a guest in the center's
swimming pool.31 In Mooring v. Virginia Wesleyan College,32 the
court decided that a college professor who established a volunteer
program at a local boys and girls club using his students was not
protected by the club's charitable immunity for negligence while he
was present at the club observing a student's performance.32 '
316. Montalvo, 167 F.3d at 874.
317. See Gray v. INOVA Health Care Servs., 257 Va. 597, 514 S.E.2d 355 (1999).
318. 256 Va. 221, 504 S.E.2d 621 (1998).
319. See id. at 227, 504 S.E.2d at 624.
320. 257 Va. 509, 514 S.E.2d 619 (1999).
321. See id. at 512, 514 S.E.2d at 621.
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